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GIVING TEETH TO STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
USING HISTORY TO ARGUE UTAH'S
CONSTITUTION AFFORDS GREATER
PROTECTIONS TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
SAM NEWTON

Since the 1970s, state courts have been much more willing to use
their State constitutions to guarantee fundamental rights.' While the United
States Supreme Court "dominated the development of constitutional law" for
decades in the mid-twentieth century, in some measure because State courts
were "part of the societal problem," today, "a single courageous state," as
Justice Louis Brandeis put it, "may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country." 2 States have recently used their constitutions to
experiment with gay marriage, marijuana regulation, and capital punishment,
among many other issues.
Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as SeparateSources of FundamentalRights, 35
RUTGERS LAW REV. 707, 708 (1983); John Dinan, The Past,Present, and Future Role of State
Constitutions, in GUIDE STATE POLIT. POLICY 19 (Richard G. Niemi & Joshua J. Dyck eds.,

2013). One scholar has argued that state constitutions, which are much longer and have been
amended more often, fill in the gaps from the "incomplete" federal constitution. Donald S.
Lutz, The United States Constitution as an Incomplete Text, 496 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. Soc.
Sci. 23 (1988). Indeed, as Justice Story put it, the States can exist without the national
government, but the national government cannot without them. JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE

CONSTITUTION, at 370 § 511 (1873) ("the State governments are, by the very theory of the
Constitution, essential parts of the general government. They can exist without the latter, but

the latter

cannot exist without them."); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE
(2000).
' New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Pollock, supra note 1, at 711. Justice Brennan was the strongest advocate for this approach.

CONSTITUTIONS

William J. Brennan Jr, State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, HARV. LAW
REV. 489 (1977); William J. Brennan Jr, The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 NYU LAW REV. 535, 548 (1986) (the
Supreme Court's "contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds of federalism should
be interpreted as a plain invitation to state courts to step into the breach.").
' See generally, John Dinan, Policy Provisions in State Constitutions: The Standardsand
Practice of State Constitution-Making in the Post-Baker v. Carr Era, 60 WAYNE LAW REV.
155 (2014); Rosalie L. Pacula et al., Words Can Be Deceiving: A Review of Variation among
Legally Effective Medical Marijuana Laws in the United States, 7 J. DRUG POLICY ANAL. 1
(2014); David Blake & Jack Finlaw, MarijuanaLegalization in Colorado:LearnedLessons, 8
HARV. LAW POLICY REV. 359 (2014); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and
Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA LAW REV. 74 (2015); Ernest A. Young, Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty as Federalism Strategies: Lessons from the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 85 UNIV.
COLO. LAW REV. 1133 (2014); EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE
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Unlike the federal constitution, which has rarely been amended, State
constitutions have followed Thomas Jefferson's adage that because "the earth
belongs always to the living generation," they ought to be amended every
few decades. 4 State courts see the vast majority of criminal defendants and
have significantly more opportunities to protect a defendant's rights and to
restrain government abuses of power. One judge congratulated "state judges
who have resumed their historic role as the primary defenders of civil
liberties and equal rights." 6
But advocates must first raise state constitutional claims in those
courts. A law school curriculum, with its much stronger focus on federal law,
may not adequately prepare lawyers to think in terms of their individual state
constitutions. "[W]e must have the assistance of able counsel who present
thoughtful arguments predicated not only on the United States Constitution
but also on state constitutions." Lawyers should not assume state courts are
unwilling to interpret their constitutions differently and should provide state
courts with compelling reasons to deviate from the federal interpretations.
I will use the example of one state-Utah-in which an exploration
of its unique history shows how an advocate might use its constitution to
argue for greater protections for a criminal defendant. The Utah Constitution
contains several unique provisions and the Utah courts have demonstrated a
keen willingness to create a separate body of state constitutional law,

CONSTITUTION 3-5, 168-70, 202-12 (2017); Daniel 0. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and
Same-Sex Marriage, 89 INDIANA LAW J. 27 (2014). People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal.
1972); District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980);
People v. LaValle (NY 2004); Rauf v. State (Del. 2016). After courts in California and
Massachusetts invalidated the death penalty, voters in both states amended their constitutions
to allow for the punishment. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 401 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J.
dissenting); JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION 46-47 (2015).
4 Dinan, supra note 1, at
21.
' Robert M. Howard et al., State Courts, the US Supreme Court, and the Protection of
Civil Liberties, 40 LAW Soc. REV. 845, 846 (2006) (state courts, relying on state constitutions
"can offer enhanced protection for civil liberties beyond the baselines established by a federal
constitution and a national court."); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State
Constitutions: The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. LAW REV. 1141, 1148-49
(1984); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and
Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. LAW REV. 1, 20 n. 109 (2017); Constance Baker Motley, Civil RightsCivil Liberties Litigation in the US Supreme Court: Are the State Courts Our Only Hope, 9
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 101, 104 (1992) ("For expansion of existing rights or new views of
various rights, many litigants have recently turned to state courts for a more receptive judicial
ear."); James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEORGETOWN LAW J. 1003, 1006
(2002) (arguing that robust use of state constitutions can not only check abuses of power from
the state government but "to resist abuses of power by the national government itself.").
6 j. Skelly Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11
HASTINGS CONST. LAW Q. 165, 165, 188 (1983).
' Pollock, supra note 1, at 721.
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repeatedly inviting counsel to brief and argue state constitutional issues.8
Often, lawyers fail to provide historical arguments to support these
arguments, preventing the courts from availing themselves of these
opportunities.'
History provides fertile ground to support state constitutional claims.
Utah is no exception. For criminal defendants in particular, Mormons, who
comprised most of the state constitutional delegates, were targeted over
several decades with wide-scale and abusive polygamy prosecutions. More
than perhaps any other delegation in constitutional history, Utah's
constitutional framers were acutely aware of governmental abuses of power
in criminal prosecutions. They wrote a strong constitution to protect against
those problems from happening again.
While there are numerous potential avenues of exploration, in this
article I will give three specific examples to illustrate how unique aspects of
Utah history could be used to argue that its state constitution provides greater
protections to its citizens than Americans receive under the United States
Constitution: 1) Utah's constitution requires a defendant to be present at all
court hearings; 2) Utah's constitution creates a robust right to a fair and
impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community; and 3)
Utah's constitution requires that the mentally ill should be treated rather than
simply incarcerated.
To further this end, I suggest criminal law practitioners should be
more willing to review publications like the Utah Historical Quarterly (or
their local historical publications) and to consult their State history books or
the state constitutional debates in order to present similar claims to their state
courts.
One should support a state constitutional claim with multiple pieces
of information. The Utah Supreme Court uses four primary methods to
interpret its own constitution: the plain language of the text itself, the
historical context when the provisions were drafted, judicial interpretation,
and the "particular attitudes and traditions within a state."' 0 These four
' See e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) ("It is imperative that Utah
lawyers brief this Court on relevant state constitutional questions."); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d
1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Until such time as attorneys heed the call of the appellate
courts of this state to more fully brief and argue the applicability of the state constitution, we
cannot meaningfully play our part in the judicial laboratory of autonomous state constitutional
law development.") (overruled on other basis) (internal citation omitted); Laura Dupaix, Linda
Jones, and Christina Jepson Schmutz, InterpretingRules and ConstitutionalProvisions, Utah
B.J., March/April 2008, at 29, 32 ("For over twenty years, the Utah Supreme Court has
pressed litigants to raise constitutional issues under our state constitution, particularly in
criminal cases...").
9 James A. Gardner, Autonomy and Isomorphism: The Unfulfilled Promise of Structural
Autonomy in American State Constitutions, 60 WAYNE LAW REv. 31, 34 (2014).
10 Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules
Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH REV 751, 775-80 (1993).
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methods would be helpful in interpreting any state constitution, given their
comprehensiveness.
Of course, "the first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all
instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms and
intention of the parties," which often involves interpreting the text itself."
Constitutions are not drafted in a vacuum and, as this article demonstrates, an
advocate can educate a court about the context of a given constitutional
provision. But even if the language is vague, or the provision lacks historical
context, a lawyer can also look to how the state's courts have dealt with the
issue, or how the state's traditions or history have handled the problem.
In this article, I will use all four methods of analysis to support the
first example. In the two sections to follow, for sake of length, I will more
generally lay out the claims without using all four methods, with the added
proviso that all four methods should be utilized, as much as possible, in
presenting a state constitutional claim to a court.
I.

UTAH'S CONSTITUTION REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO BE
PRESENT AT ALL HEARINGS IN HIS CASE.

The Utah Constitution and its history support a contention that
defendants need be present during all hearings in the case. Thus, a
defendant's rights are violated whenever proceedings are conducted in his
absence.
A. Plain Language
The plain language of Utah's Constitutional provision differs from
that of the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."' 2 The Utah Constitution, by contrast, gives
an additional right: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person. ."' The federal constitution contains no
provision giving a defendant the right "to appear and defend in person." The
federal constitution restricts its application to witness testimony, while
Utah's Constitution provides the additional right for a defendant to be present
throughout the entire trial "in person." Thus, the plain language of Utah's
" 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States section 400, at
305 (5th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1905) (1891). See also, 1 Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations 124 (8th ed. 1927) ("the object of construction, as applied to a written constitution,
is to give effect to the intent of the people adopting it.");
American Bush v. City of South Salt
Lake, 2006 UT 40,
10, 140 P.3d 1235; American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069,
1072 (Utah 1985).

U.S.Const.Amend.VI.
Utah Const.Art. I,§ 12.
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Constitution requires a defendant's presence during any portion of his case.
A court's decision to conduct proceedings without the defendant could be
grounds for a new trial. This includes jury selection, witness testimony, jury
instructions or even answering a jury's questions.
B. HistoricalEvidence of the Framers'Intent
Beyond the plain language of a particular constitutional provision,
the court should consider "historical evidence of the framers' intent," "our14
state's particular traditions, and the intent of our constitution's drafters.'
Utah's constitutional framers profoundly distrusted government and therefore
sought to protect defendants from abuses which took place when judicial
proceedings occurred behind closed doors.
By the late 1880s, the Utah Territory was religiously, politically, and
economically polarized. Congress's anti-polygamy legislation left much of
the Mormon leadership imprisoned or in hiding. The federal government
seized church properties and threatened to take their temples too. Church
members were understandably bitter. 15
In this time of turmoil, Mormons in particular were upset at judicial
proceedings which occurred "behind closed doors" without "a line of
pleading or record, nor a word of counsel or client."' 6 They complained that
judges would go "outside of the record" to convict people of crimes.'1 For
example, prosecutors called Brigham Young's polygamy case at a time when
"he was sick and it was bitter winter weather," even though he "had been
given to understand that his case would not be called until the spring term of
court."' 8 Mormons felt that the judge and prosecutor rigged the proceeding to
occur without Young and his counsel. '9 In another case, the court refused to
allow a defendant to testify in his own defense.20 Mormons, or even their
sympathizers, were also excluded from jury service."

14

American Bush, 2006 UT 40,

11-12 (quoting West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872

P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994)).
15 JEAN B. WHITE, THE UTAH

STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 7 (1998).
16 EDWARD WILLIAM TULLIDGE, HISTORY OF SALT LAKE CITY 567, 574 (1886).
17

Id. at 570.

" JOSEPH FIELDING

SMITH

SMITH TO THE PRESENT TIME

&

CHURCH

OF

JESUS

CHRIST

OF LATTER-DAY

SAINTS,

A

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH FROM THE BIRTH OF JOSEPH

(1922),

WITH INTRODUCTORY CHAPTERS ON THE ANTIQUITY OF

ESSENTIALS IN CHURCH HISTORY:

THE GOSPEL AND THE "FALLING AWAY,"

558-59 (1922).

19 Id.

" JoAnn W. Bair & Richard L. Jensen, Prosecutionof the Mormons in Arizona Territory
in the 1880s, 19 ARIZ. WEST 25, 34 (1977).

" ROSA MAE MCCLELLAN EVANS, JUDICIAL PROSECUTION OF PRISONERS FOR LDS
PLURAL MARRIAGE: PRISON SENTENCES, 1884-1895 47 (1986) (BRIGHAM YOUNG UNWERSITY.
DEPT. OF HISTORY).

Giving Teeth to State Constitutions

Over twenty years after Utah became a State, Mormons still bitterly
recalled that period:
The petty officers and the judges of the courts carried on a
reign of terror in their determination to stamp out the
practice of plural marriage, and it appeared that the greatest
crime in the world was for a man to acknowledge honestly
that he was the husband of more than one wife, and that he
diligently and faithfully supported them and their children;
while for the libertine and the harlot there was protection by
officers of law.22

As the church put it, judges and prosecutors boasted that Mormon
polygamists "would be convicted with or without evidence before the
courts."23 One scholar commented that these trials "portended extremes
which would sometimes turn prosecution into persecution" and that the trials
became "ruthless" and "extreme., 2 4 A Declaration of Grievances and Protest
sent by territorial officials to President Grover Cleveland complained that,
"[t]rial by jury in the Territories
is no longer a safeguard against injustice to a
• ,,15
Mormon accused of crime.
The methods employed in prosecuting
polygamists were "difficult to justify" and denied "basic American rights and
freedoms, without trial, to the large nonpolygamous majority of the Mormon
population in order to bring the offending minority within the law ....
It is in this context that a group of 107 delegates, all Mormon except
27
for 29, met in 1895 to draft the State constitution. The constitutional
delegates were aware of what they deemed to be a "judicial crusade," where
people were tried and convicted under an array of unjust procedures, often in
their absence and often without evidence.28
The framers' detailed discussion on Article I, section 12 at the
constitutional convention reflects that the delegates were concerned,
particularly given their frustration with recent quasi-judicial proceedings, that
criminal defendants have a right to attend their entire trial.
While discussing Article I, section 11, one of the delegates, Mr.
Anderson, proposed adding the language that "no person shall be barred from
SMITH & SAINTS,

2

Id. at 605.

supra note 20, at 596.

GUSTVE OLOF LARSON,

THE "AMERICANIZATION"

OF UTAH FOR STATEHOOD 1 10

(Huntington Library publications, 1971).
25 Id. at 126.
26 Id. at 276.
supranote 17, at 9.
James B. Allen, "Good Guys" vs. "Good Guys": Rudger Clawson, John Sharp,
and
Civil Disobedience in Nineteenth-Century Utah, 48 UTAH HIST. Q. 154, 156 (1980); LARSON,
supra note 26, at 76, 105, 109, 117, 213, 235, 278.
27 WHITE,
21
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prosecuting or defending himself before any tribunal in this State by
himself.. ."29 Mr. Anderson explained that "the amendment that I offered
should prevail, because I think that this is a constitutional right that should be
guaranteed to every citizen if he so desires."30 Another delegate, Mr. Varian,
said that by confining the amendment to civil cases, "it might be held to
prevent his appearance in criminal cases. It is just as important and
necessary to include it here."'" Mr. James responded that section 12 provided
the remedy they contemplated. "[A]nother section does provide that he shall
appear in criminal cases," Mr. James Stated. Mr. Anderson added, "[t]he
next section [section 12] provides for criminal cases. 32 The delegates then
discussed the pros and cons of self-representation and one's right to defend
oneself."' Mr. Cannon later responded, "I think that everyone should have
3 4 the
right to appear and defend his property as well as to defend his person."
When the discussion moved to section 12, one of the delegates
proposed eliminating the requirement that a defendant "meet the witnesses
face to face" with the words, "to be confronted by the witnesses against
him. Two delegates vigorously opposed the amendment:
[This amendment] strikes out one of the greatest safeguards
there is to a citizen. Now if a person or witness had the
opportunity of having his deposition taken in some far off
county, or some far off state, why a witness under these
conditions is likely to testify to anything. I think that the
accused should have the right of having the witness confront
him and then the jury can tell whether he is telling the truth
or not. I think that if we would authorize the taking of
depositions, it would take away one of the greatest
safeguards that there is guaranteed by our Constitution. 36
The second delegate also opposed it on grounds that prosecution
testimony could be conducted in the defendant's absence:
[The amendment] will permit prosecutions, or the
Legislature to authorize the prosecution in criminal cases to
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION: ASSEMBLED

AT SALT LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH
STATE OF UTAH 304-05 (1898).

Id. at 305.
2

Id. (emphasis added).
d. (emphasis added).

Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 306.
35id.
36id.

1895,

TO ADOPT A CONSTITUTION FOR THE
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take depositions of witnesses who are not present, who may
be absent in some other state or absent in some other county,
and if that loophole was thrown open, I do not see that there
would be any safety for any man to have a trial and have a
fair defense. I do not believe that a man could have a fair
defense unless his witnesses were compelled to be in
attendance where he could have the chance to crossexamine.... I think that witnesses should be compelled to
be in court and there testify before him ....[I]n my opinion

the only way to have a fair trial is to have the witnesses face
to face with the defendant and allow him to have a chance to
cross-examine.
Even though one delegate supported the amendment, the convention
rejected it. While the amendment had to do specifically with the right of
cross-examination, the delegates did not further discuss section 12's
requirement of "appear and defend in person." However, it is clear that the
legislature did not want legal proceedings occurring in the defendant's
absence. They wanted an entire criminal proceeding to occur while the
defendant was present. Clearly, therefore, the constitutional delegates
preserved in Article I, §12 a defendant's constitutional right to be present
during all of the proceedings against him.
Thus, both the history and context of Utah's constitution show the
delegates insisted criminal proceedings occur only when the defendant was
present. They saw this as a guarantee of liberty and certainly a way to protect
against the closed-prosecutions many of them had personally experienced.
C. JudicialInterpretation
Article I, §12 was "modeled on the Washington State Constitution of
1889." 37 The "appear and defend" provision also occurs in several state
38
constitutions. While few cases have construed these provisions as to a
supra note 17, at 39-40; OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES
31, at 310.; Martin B. Hickman, Utah ConstitutionalLaw 72
(1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah) ("The constant appeal to the
authority of other states is one of the most striking impressions one gains from reading the
debates."); Brad C. Smith, Comment, Be No More Children: An Analysis ofArticle I, Section 4
of the Utah Constitution, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 1431, 1454 ("Apparently, the drafters of the 1895
Utah Constitution sought to find model constitutions that were current and that would prove
acceptable to Congress.").
" E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 11, § 24 ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person, and by counsel."); Ark. Const. art. 2, § 10 (heard by
himself and counsel); Cal. Const. art. 1, § 13 (appear and defend in person and with counsel);
Colo. Const. art. II, § 16 (appear and defend in person and by counsel or both); Del. Const. art.
1, § 7 (heard by himself and his counsel); Fla. Const. art. 1, § 16 (heard in person, by counsel
17 WHITE,

OF THE CONVENTION, supra note
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defendant's right to be present, the cases appear to uniformly hold that trial
proceedings which occur outside the defendant's physical presence violate
these state constitutions. In an 1883 Missouri case, prior to Utah's use of the
same language from Missouri's constitution, a defendant objected that he
was absent during part of the litigation on his motion for new trial. The
Supreme Court of Missouri, reversing the conviction and remanding for a
new trial, said that the defendant's absence was critical under its State
constitution:
The accused demanded his right, under the constitution, to
be present, not at the trial in the technical narrow sense of
the statute,... for the constitution has no such restricted
meaning, but to appear and defend throughout the
proceeding against him, which is pending in the trial court
until the determination of the cause by the rendition of a
judgment. If the court could refuse to permit the accused to
be present, with equal propriety it could exclude his counsel.
The constitution does not declare that either may appear, but
"that the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person, and by counsel." He has the right to be there to make
suggestions to his counsel, or, if he desire, to argue the
motion to the court. It is a constitutionalright, but if neither
guaranteed by constitution nor by statute so reasonable a
request as that of a prisoner on trial for his life or liberty, to
be present at any important step in his cause, should be
granted.
The court emphasized that this constitutional provision created a
right to be present that was not limited to the trial, but to any part of the
proceeding.
In an early North Dakota case, during deliberations, the court called
jurors back into the courtroom and, without the defendant or counsel present,
read back to them portions of the testimony. This violated the State
constitution (that used the same language as Utah's constitution). The court
said,
The defendant had the constitutional right to be present and
defend in person and with counsel during the whole of the
or both); Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13 (appear and defend in person and with counsel); Mass.
Const. pt. 1, § 13 (fully heard in his defense by himself, or his counsel, at his election); Neb.
Const. art. 1, § 11 (appear and defend in person or by counsel); Okla. Const. art. 2, § 20 (heard

by himself and counsel); Wash. Const. Art 1 § 22 (appear and defend in person and by
counsel).
" State v. Hoffman, 78 Mo. 256, 259-60 (1883) (emphasis added).
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trial. The proceeding complained of was a part of the trial.
The jury was in the box. The judge was upon the bench, and
ordered the court stenographer to read the testimony of a
witness, to which the jury listened and after retiring returned
the verdict of "guilty." It was a plain violation of
40 the statute,
and of the constitutionalrights of the defendant.
In a later North Dakota case, the court responded to a jury question
with both counsel present, but in the defendant's absence. 4' The court also
found this procedure to violate its State constitutional provision of one's right
to appear and defend in person: "[W]e conclude that Smuda had a
constitutional right, under our state constitution, to be present in person
during the proceedings involving the jury request and court response thereto
and that right was violated." Id. at 168.42 In an early New York case, the
court found that a jury view of the scene conducted without the defendants
"was a denial of the [state] constitutional rights of the defendants 'to appear
and defend in person' during a part of the trial. The right of
43 a party to be
present at every part of the trial," the court said, "is absolute.,
Therefore, multiple courts have held that this state constitutional
provision prohibits the court from conducting proceedings without the
defendant.
Utah decisions also support this view of article I, §12. The Utah
Supreme Court has stated that article I, §12 "guarantees the right of an
accused to appear and defend in person against any cause against him., 44 The
court interpreted
Rule
17 of the Utah Rules of •Criminal
Procedure as
,,.
•
45
"implement[ing] the [state] constitutional right" at trial. The rule quotes the

41 State v. Schasker, 60 N.D. 462, 235 N.W. 345, 346 (1931) (emphasis added).
41

42

State v. Smuda, 419 N.W.2d 166, 167 (N.D. 1988).

The court found the error harmless, but said "[t]his would be a different case if there

had been an open court communication between the judge and the jury without Smuda's
personal presence. In that event, Smuda's constitutional confrontation rights would have been
implicated and his absence may very well have resulted in prejudice to him." Smuda, 419
N.W.2d at 168. See also People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 207, 329 P.2d 157, 172
(1958) (a defendant's right to "appear and defend, in person" under the State constitution is
violated when "he is prevented from being present during the presentation of matters before
the triers of fact or such other times as his absence would thwart a fair and just hearing").
41 People v. Hartnett, 124 Misc. 418, 421, 208 N.Y.S. 246, 250 (Co. Ct.
1925); see also
People v. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d 237, 246, 613 N.E.2d 946, 950 (1993) (defendant's "State
constitutional right" to appear and defend was violated when trial court denied him the
opportunity to be present during sidebars when he represented himself).
44State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah 1996).
45Id.

Utah Journalof CriminalLaw

state constitutional provision, which further details, that a defendant "shall be
personally present at trial ....
The Utah Supreme Court has construed the "appear and defend"
provision. In 1903, the court stated,
The provisions in [the State Constitution] which guaranty the
accused, in a criminal action, the right to "appear and defend
in person and by counsel," and "to be confronted by the
witnesses against him," were designed to protect every
person accused of crime against judgment of condemnation
without a hearing in open court, or by secret trial.
The court also said that the clause is implicated when the act
involves the "taking of evidence" or is "a part of the trial., 48 Thus,

defendants have a state constitutional right to be "personally present" when
any of the proceedings of the trial were conducted. If this right is violated, a
defendant should be entitled to a new trial, since a violation amounts to
structural error.
D. ParticularAttitudes and Traditions Within a State

The Utah Supreme Court has also suggested courts look to "our
state's particular traditions" in determining the intent of a particular
constitutional provision.49 In 2013, the Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme
Court told the state legislature that Utah's courts are "regarded as one of the
most transparent court systems in the country.",50 "Our courts need to be
welcoming to all," he said, adding that we must make "sure our courts are
like a big tent, with its flaps wide open, with
room for everyone, not like a
51
few.",
the
to
only
accessible
fortress
walled
Transparency and openness, however, can only occur when a
defendant is present during the criminal proceedings against him. The courts
cannot be fair, transparent, and open when the defendant is not present when
jurors discuss the case with the court or it takes evidence. The defendant,

6

Utah R. Crim. P. 17. The rule differentiates a death penalty case from other cases, in

effect stating that a defendant's absence in a death penalty case prevents the case from being
tried and from a judgment entering. According to the rule, the trial begins from the reading of
the charge to the rendering of the verdict. Id. at (g) - (o).
47 State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312, 73 P. 562, 572 (1903) (emphasis
added).
41 Id. at 571.
49 American Bush, 2006 UT 40,
11-12 (quoting West, 872 P.2d at 1013).
5' Remarks by Chief Justice Matthew B. Durrant, 28 January 2013, 2013 General Session
of the Sixtieth Legislature (available at https://perma.cc/G8EZ-RCWX).
51 Id. at 9.
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who has constitutional rights at stake, must be the first to observe what
happens with her case.
Utah courts have allowed judicial proceedings
to occur in a
51
defendant's absence, even in the most serious of cases. Illustrating the need
for fully raising state claims with the courts, the Utah Supreme Court refused
to address a capital defendant's argument that his absence from court
proceedings violated the Utah Constitution because the issue was not
adequately briefed. The defendant did not "offer any analysis of this
constitutional provision to support his argument" and because he "provided
us with no argument to consider," the court declined to "address his state
constitutional claim."
Utilizing all four bases of constitutional analysis, a defense attorney
could easily justify claiming that her client has a right under the state
constitution to be present during any portion of his case.
II.

UTAH'S CONSTITUTION SUPPORTS DRAWING A JURY FROM THE
POPULATION AT LARGE AND NOT EXCLUDING THOSE WHO
DISTRUST THE GOVERNMENT OR WHO ARE SYMPATHETIC TO
THE DEFENDANT.

Defendants could argue under Utah's constitution that their jury
panels need to be more representative of the population at large. The vast
majority of Mormon constitutional delegates had experienced deprivations of
the right to fair and impartial juries. Because of their concerns, Utah's
constitutional framers created a constitutional provision that more
significantly protects a defendant's right to an impartial jury than the federal
counterpart. That constitutional provision demands a fair cross-section of the
community be in the jury box.
In the nineteenth century, Mormons "challenged too many American
norms to be left alone" and "were unsuccessful in convincing the American
public that Utah was not a hive of lasciviousness and tyranny.", 54 In
criminalizing polygamy, one Representative, Lawrence M. Keitt of South
Carolina, criticized that a federal bill attacking Mormon polygamy
jeopardized the right to a fair trial: "Are you prepared to start the
Government upon this crusade against manners and morals? Are you willing
to substitute the sword for trial by jury, and to carry out, by flame and

51 See State v. Gunter, 2013 UT App 140,

25, 304 P.3d 866 (finding harmless error
where trial occurred in defendant's absence and citing Art. I § 12 of the Utah Constitution).
51 State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 55 n.38, 299 P.3d 892.
51 MATTHEW BURTON BOWMAN, THE MORMON PEOPLE: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN
FAITH

124, 141 (2012).
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violence, an indictment against a whole community?" 55 As Representative
McClernand put it, a jury from the Mormon community would not convict
their fellows:
This is the whole extent of the remedy proposed by the
committee's bill-a bill which assumes and relies upon the
Mormons-polygamists
themselves, to execute its
provisions. Does not everyone know that the Mormons will
not enforce such a law against themselves? That a grand jury
of polygamists will not indict a polygamist? And that a petty
5
jury of polygamists will not convict a brother polygamist.
Congress's solution to this problem became simple: remove
Mormons from jury service because of their predisposition to acquit. 57When
the United States Congress proposed giving "authority to the federal marshal
to select all jurors" in criminal cases in Utah and even "eliminated trial by
jury in cases involving polygamy," Brigham Young, the territorial governor
"was outraged." Writing to Utah's territorial delegate in Washington,
Young asserted:
He might have added to it that no Mormon shall be allowed
to vote on any occasion whatever, nor hold office in Utah or
in any Territory, or State of the Union.
I have a proposition to make to [the Senator who proposed
the bill] and all such men. When my old [servant] has been
dead one year, if they will wash their faces clean they may
kiss his -.
I hold all such men in the greatest contempt and fear not
their wicked deeds.
While that particular bill did not pass, a few years later,
Representative Shelby M. Cullom succeeded in proposing a bill that
"place[d] in the hands of the U.S. marshal and U.S. attorney responsibility

55 EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE

& RICHARD

COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
56Id. at 136 (citing CongressionalGlobe 1860, 1514).

1830-1900, at 135 (2001).

57 H.R. 3097, 43d Cong. (1874); Clawson v. United States, 114 U.S. 477, 478, 5
S. Ct.

949, 949, 29 L. Ed. 179 (1885).
5' LEONARD

J.

ARRINGTON, BRIGHAM YOUNG: AMERICAN MOSES

ALLEN & GLEN M. LEONARD, THE STORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS
59 ARRINGTON, supra note 60, at 363-64.

363 (1986); JAMES B.
351 (2nd ed. ed. 1992).
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for selecting jurors." 0 Five-thousand Mormon women gathered in the Salt
Lake6 1 Tabernacle and held a "massive 'indignation meeting' to protest the
bill.
When President Ulysses S. Grant sent Chief Justice McKean to Utah
"with instructions to root out polygamy by strictly enforcing the law,"
McKean took it upon himself
to aggressively use the power of the courts to
• 61
stamp out the practice. McKean said God "has called upon me" that
"whenever or wherever I may find the Local or Federal laws obstructing or
interfering
therewith, by God's blessing I shall trample them under my
, 63
feet.
"Increasingly harsh federal legislation outlawed polygamy,
disenfranchised the Mormon faithful, kept believers off'uries, and ultimately
disincorporated the church., 64 Mormons called this period a "judicial reign of
terror" and defended their right to an unbiased jury.6
The Mormon predicament in the West paralleled in many
respects the situation the early colonists in America faced
with regard to England. Most colonists were very loyal to
England but strenuously objected to what they felt were
serious deprivations of their constitutional rights as
Englishmen, including the right to jury trial by their peers,
the right to an independent judiciary, and the right to selfrule.... The Mormons tried to protect their rights against
federal encroachments, and issues involving jury trials, and
independent judiciary, and self-rule were raised again in the
Utah Territory.66
Once prosecutors put the law into practice, as people predicted,
convictions were hard to come by. Federal officials "found that gaining
convictions in front of a Mormon jury was
given
• 67 remarkably difficult,"
jurors' sympathies to the religious doctrines. Federal judges attacked proMormon juries by using a territorial statute that allowed the marshal to
summon jurors. Removing Mormons from jury service made indicting them
much easier as Judge McKean found:
6'

H.R. 1089, 41st Cong. § 12 (1870); Id. at 364.

61 Id.

6' ALLEN & LEONARD, supranote 60, at 353.

6' EDWARD WILLIAM TULLIDGE, LIFE OF BRIGHAM YOUNG: OR, UTAH AND HER FOUNDERS

420-21 (1876).
64 FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 57, at 128 (emphasis added).
65 BRIGHAM HENRY ROBERTS & JOHN TAYLOR, THE LIFE OF JOHN TAYLOR:
THIRD
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS
66 FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 57, at 128.

67 BOWMAN, supra note 56, at 143.

311 (1892).
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For near twenty years the Mormon leaders packed the Grand
and Petit juries of the United States Courts with their tools
and instruments. But within a few months past we have
decided against this system ... to recognize only the U.S.
Attorney and the U.S. Marshal as the proper officers of our
courts. One of the consequences is that we have already
indicted for capital offenses ten or twelve Mormons-some
of them bishops and other influential men in the Mormon
establishment.68
Mormons complained that Judge McKean's practices resulted in
"packed juries of pronounced anti-Mormons, chosen to convict the Church
leaders."69 John Taylor, future president of the church, believed these tactics
showed that "the government of the United States is at war" with the church
itself and that it would "end in disaster to the liberties of the people."' 0
Taylor counseled the faithful, in a published letter, to submit, despite the
injustice:
Let them pack juries fresh from houses of ill-fame to try you
on virtue. Never mind, it is their virtue that suffers, not
yours. Let them try you for living with and protecting your
wives and providing for your children; fidelity and virtue
are
• 71
not crimes in the eyes of the Almighty, only in theirs.
In the meantime, the Mormon-dominated territorial legislature
responded by empowering Utah's probate courts with general jurisdiction
over criminal cases, giving probate judges, not the territorial marshal, control
over the drawing of jury lists. When an appeal over the jury selection
procedure reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court held that
Judge McKean in his "efforts to purge juries of Mormons and secure the
conviction of polygamists" had "improperly ignored Utah's jury selection
procedures." ' 2 Particularly, the Supreme Court found that because Congress
had approved the Organic Act creating the territory, it silently acquiesced to
the territorial legislature's authority to determine jury selection.
Mormons were elated at the victory. One-hundred and thirty
indictments were quashed and given that the federal marshal could not draw
jury lists, "no juries were summoned" and "Utah's judicial system was
57, at 145.
67, at 312.

6 FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note
69 ROBERTS

&

TAYLOR, supra note

71 Id. at 312-13.
71 Id. at
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7' FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note
57, at 138.
71 Clinton v. Englebrecht,80 U.S. 434, 441, 446, 20 L. Ed. 659
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effectively paralyzed.", 74 An editorial in the Deseret News exulted that the
decision constituted "a virtual declaration by the highest authority in the land
that no portion of the people of the United States-however abhorrent their
religious
faith-can be deprived of their liberties except by due process of
, 75
law.'

However, Utah's non-Mormon governor was not happy with the
decision. "Under the law as laid down by the Supreme Court," he
complained in a letter to President Ulysses Grant, "a Mormon Marshall will
summon a Mormon jury to try Mormon criminals, each, and all, of whom
regard their duty to the Church as above the law." It would make the law a
farce, he claimed, and "makes the Mormons very jubilant, arrogant, [and]
insolent.

.

." The court's decision, he decried, allowed "more than twenty

murderers in Salt Lake City alone, who committed some as dark and
diabolical crimes as darken 7the annals of human depravity ... to be turned
loose upon the community.", 6
President Grant took the governor's protest to Congress. In his State
of the Union address, he asserted that "it is absolutely necessary that
Congress provide the courts with some mode of obtaining jurors." Grant
wanted convictions:
[I]n order to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to
maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United States and
of the Federal Government, [it is necessary] to provide that
the selection of grand and petit jurors for the district courts,
if not put under the control of federal officers, shall be
placed in the hands of persons entirely independent of those
who are determined not to enforce any act of Congress
obnoxious to them ....
I am convinced that so long as Congress leaves the selection
of jurors to the local authorities it will be futile to make any
effort to enforce laws not acceptable to a majority of the
people of the Territory, or which interfere with local
prejudices or provide for the punishment of polygamy or any
of its affiliated vices or crimes.
Congress responded with the Poland Act, which allowed the United
States marshal and territorial marshal to prepare a list of 200 persons, each

74 FIRMAGE
75 Id.

76 Id.

& MANGRUM, supra note 57, at 146.
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71

officer drawing alternate names. In effect, the Act "nullified Englebrechtby
creating a new jury selection process aimed at limiting Mormon
control ...

"

Mormons bristled that the act denied them representation on

juries under the new regime, saying that the "Gentile population-at the time
but an insignificant minority of the inhabitants of Utah-was given equal
representation on the juries with the overwhelming majority of the people." 0
John Taylor, church president, asserted these trials were conducted
under the auspices of "packed grand juries with unanimous alacrity [to] do
the bidding of over-zealous prosecuting attorneys."" Taylor continued,
And there, in this ignominious position, [the defendant]
stands with every person who might possibly be his friend,
excluded from the jury, without the possibility of a fair trial
by his peers, not one of the panel being in the least sympathy
with himself; by such people this unfortunate young
gentleman has to be tried, judged, prosecuted, proscribed and
condemned... "
Under this new act, Mormons arranged a test case, confident that the
Supreme Court would again invalidate the politically manipulative attempts
to secure convictions. Their confidence was wrongly placed. A halfMormon, half-non-Mormon jury convicted George Reynolds of polygamy.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning in part that
jurors could be properly excluded for their belief in polygamy.83 Reynolds
opened the door to a broad series of future abuses of the jury system in Utah.
In his 1879 State of the Union Address, President Rutherford B.
Hayes said that because of Mormons' disobedience to the law, "the
enjoyment and exercise of the rights and privileges of citizenship in the
Territories of the United States may be withheld or withdrawn" from them.
The next year, Hayes again recommended that "the right to vote, hold office,
and sit on juries in the Territory of Utah be confined to those who neither
practice nor uphold polygamy."8 4 Congress responded to Hayes' call with the
Edmunds Act, which allowed current and former polygamists, or those who
believed in it, even those who remained silent when questioned, to be

7' 2 Cong. Rec. 4475, 5415, 5417 (1874).
79 FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 57,
ROBERTS & TAYLOR, supra note 67, at

at 148-49.
319.

Id. at 375.
82 Id.
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excluded from 8jury service, which essentially eliminated every faithful
5
church member.
Senator Wilkinson Call of Florida lodged an objection to the
Edmunds bill when it was debated in the Senate, which Mormons quoted in
their official publication, the Millennial Star. According to Senator Call, the
bill imposed a religious test that deprives one of a fair trial:
If there be anything sacred in the history of American
jurisprudence and American liberty it is that a person
charged with crime shall have a fair and an impartial jury of
his peers, and not by a packed jury selected of men known to
be opposed to him and prejudiced against him, and a
religious test imposed upon them for their qualification as
jurors.

86

Despite Call's objection, the Edmunds Act passed Congress.
Consequently, the federal government convicted more than 1,000
polygamists before Mormons officially renounced the practice. 87 Mormons
continued to complain that "juries were packed to convict" and that a
Mormon "accused of violation of the anti-polygamy laws" was forced to
stand "before a jury of his avowed political and religious enemies."
The United States Supreme Court rejected multiple challenges to the
jury selection procedure, reasoning that jurors could be disqualified for their
belief, even non-practice, of polygamy. The court upheld a statute which
allowed a juror to be excluded "for the existence of a state of mind ... which
leads to a just inference, in reference to the case, that he will not act with
entire impartiality."89 The Court also agreed that excluding someone for his
religious belief was permissible:
It needs no argument to show that a jury composed of men
entertaining [a belief in polygamy] could not have been free
from bias or prejudice on the trial for bigamy, of a person
who entertained the same belief, and whose offence
consisted in the act of living in polygamy. 9

Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (repealed 1983); FIRMAGE & MANGRUM,
supra note 57, at 161.
15

16
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However, according to two contemporary legal scholars, the Court in
this opinion "brushed aside" the idea that jurors, even those who sympathize
with a party or a party's position, such as one Mormon juror who admitted he
could convict the defendant if he violated the law, can still serve, so long as
the juror commits to follow the law.91
The crusade did not abate. Prosecutors went so far as to prosecute
Mormons for perjury who failed to fully admit their alleged biases in jury
selection." In the Idaho territory, Mormons were automatically barred from
all jury service, even though the law excluded so many Mormons that "juries
could not be selected."93
In three decades of conflict (1862-1892), Congress clearly failed to
change Mormons' attitudes. For thirty years, Mormons' civil rights "were
thrust aside with little of the serious reflection that should have been
accorded each interest. Even those unsympathetic to the Mormons might
note, as a few reflective observers of the time did, that the practice of
neglecting
individual rights can become a habit that affects everyone's
94
rights.

Mormons-who comprised the vast majority of the Utah
Constitutional delegates-experienced governmental abuses of power
targeting the very composition of the jury box. When the government could
not secure the convictions it wanted from local juries, it packed those juries
with a non-Mormon minority who were already predisposed to convict. This
smacked contemporaries as a great injustice-one that they intended to fix
with their new State constitution.
Thus, when the Utah Constitutional Convention began, delegates
clearly envisioned protecting one's right to a fair and impartial jury. To them,
the jury should be composed of a random cross-section of community
members, not those predisposed to convict. So long as even one juror from
the community rejected the prosecution, then the government could not
secure a conviction.
One delegate, in speaking of Article I, section 10, called the jury "a
time honored institution." 15 He added that they should ensure "the timehonored system of the jury might remain unchanged."96 Another delegate
commented on the importance of keeping the jury system intact and
representative of the whole people, particularly noting abuses the Mormons
had recently experienced:
9' FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note

57,

at

228.

9' See United States v. Brown, 6 Utah 115, 21 P. 461,461-62 (1889).
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I do not believe that the jury system is a work of barbarism
in any sense. I believe it has been a part of the bulwark of
human liberty from the days in which our English forefathers
battled for human rights down to the present time.
It is the only branch of the judicial system which is in touch
with the people. It is the only voice that the people have in
the administration of justice; it is the only security that the
common people have. It is the jury drawn from the body of
the people, who, in times past, have stood out against the
aggressiveness of courts and executive, in defense of liberty,
and for the protection of human rights.

I fear, Mr. Chairman, that this tendency in the lastfew years
toward the abolishment of the entire jury system comes from
certain influences; from certain quarters, which are 9in the
7
nature of things antagonistic to the rights of the people.
The delegate then emphasized that the jury should fairly represent the people
of the community from which the defendant is drawn.
I would not put a word either in the Constitution or upon the
statute book that would in any degree would impair the
efficiency of the jury system, against the will of a single
citizen of the commonwealth when he is brought into court
there, either as a plaintiff or as a defendant, that he be given
the right which his father had and their fathers before him, to
demand under the Constitution the right that he has that his
claim should be decided by twelve men comingfrom his own
people, in touch with humanity, and representingits thought,

and that he should be given all the protection that he ought to
have.... [B]ut when you come to a trial jury, that last
safeguard, that last barrier, that has always stood and always
will, I believe, between the people and oppression whether
of executive power or of corporate wealth; I say, when we
come to that, we should act slowly, and wait, I think, long
before we invade in the slightest degree or particular.
The delegates were concerned that juries should have diverse viewpoints:
Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
17
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Men's minds are constituted differently. No one man thinks
as his neighbor does. Take any twelve men on this floor, no
one will give exactly the same reason for his judgment that
another man will give. Now, sir, the experience of men, the
experience of courts, have taught us that where there are
twelve men together, twelve different minds reasoning upon
the same proposition, they will arrive at a better conclusion

The verdict then will express the opinion of twelve men; the
twelve men will have different reasons for their views; each
man will have his own reason, and it seems to me that this is
a thing that we should follow."
The jury system took on religious significance for the delegates. One
delegate said it represented "the sacred judge-the Savior of mankind and
His twelve apostles."' 00 Another said it represented the twelve tribes of
Israel.'0 ' Another delegate commented on the concerns people of the time felt
about juries, particularly that the jury system was the only institution that
would protect them against this recent history of governmental abuses of
power:
[T]he people are still clinging to that right of trial by jury;
they have an affection for it; they feel that as this
government is constructed and as the pressure is growing
stronger and stronger every day against them and their acts,
and this [is] one of the last holds that they have, it is upon

the jury that they rely, not upon the court. 102

The State needed to "maintain[ ] such a tribunal which is standing
between the great aggressions of the age of this great civilization of to-day,
and the rights and liberties of the people," he said. The delegates should
"look on and try to learn from experience" that it would be a "dangerous
proposition" to limit the right to a jury trial. 103
Delegates repeatedly saw the jury system as inviolate. 104 One
delegate told the group that "there is no question in the mind of any
" Id. at 275.
100 Id. at 280.
101 Id. at 280, 286.
102 Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
10 Id. at 282.
104 Id. at 259, 260, 278, 288, 289, 291 ("bulwark between the individual and the state";
"time honored system"; "bulwark of liberty"; "time honored system"; "bulwark of human

liberty").
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gentleman on this floor as to the sacredness of the institution of the jury.'

10 5

"All of us have grown to manhood under it," he argued, "and have looked
back through the history of the past and rejoiced in it."'016
Another delegate, Mr. Bowdle, emphasized the importance of letting
the community be the conscience and the check on the government:
[T]he people have more confidence in the opinions of their
fellows, with whom they are in direct touch and sympathy,
than they have in the courts. The jury comes right down side
by side with the litigant. They are in some sense in sympathy
with the litigant, not in an unfair or undue sense, but they
know more his wants, they know more nearly what the
justice that is at stake is. Very often a court gets this kind of
an idea. He starts out a little bent in one direction, and all
earth and heaven cannot turn him from that bend and he goes
right on in that direction .... Those twelve men will look at
the thing from as many different standpoints .... [Y]ou
cannot say with all due deference to the courts that they are

at all times fair. And that is the feeling of the people. The
feeling of the people is, we cannot always trust them-as
you increase the power of the court, you increase the feeling
in the minds of the people.

107

Utah's constitutional delegates had witnessed a lengthy period of
unjust and stacked prosecutions. They were concerned that juries should
fairly represent a cross-section of the community and not be composed of
people who were pre-disposed to convict a defendant.
Based on the framers' intent, one could argue in a capital case that
death qualification for every juror (that each be willing to impose the death
penalty) violates Utah's constitution. "In theory, at least, the capital jury is
supposed to act as the conscience of the community, introducing community
standards into the administration of the death penalty."'0 8 Death qualification
"compromises the representativeness of the group of prospective jurors" in a
way that it no longer "decide[s] the case the way the community would" by
skewing the jury toward imposing death.0 9 Even jurors who oppose the
punishment should be allowed to serve under the framers' vision. Instead,
like the concerns which were expressed in the Mormon polygamous passage,
15
106
17
10

Id. at 289.
Id. at 289-90.
Id. at 292-93.
Craig Haney, Death by Design: Capital Punishment As a Social Psychological System

(2005), 106.
109

Id.
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jurors in capital cases are selected based on their predisposition to convict
and sentence one to death.
Additionally, one could argue that juries need to reflect the
demographics of the community in terms of race, gender, and other
classifications, and that they include people with opposing viewpoints.
Utah's constitutional framers intended that jurors not be excluded from
serving, even if they sympathize with a defendant. Utah's constitution,
particularly article I, section 10, demands that juries represent a fair crosssection of the community.
III.

UTAH'S CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE STATE TO TREAT ITS
MENTALLY ILL RATHER THAN INCARCERATING THEM.

Utah also has a unique history in caring for its mentally ill and its
Constitution, particularly the unnecessary rigor clause, require greater
protections for these persons when they are incarcerated. 110
Unnecessary rigor provisions existed in state constitutions as early as
1796."'1 Utah's provision was adopted in 1896, about the time four other
states adopted similar provisions."' Unnecessary rigor provisions "came out
of the Prison Reform Movement of the 1800s, whereby people sought to
make prisons more humane.""' 3 "[M]any states thought a commitment to
humanizing penal laws and the treatment of offenders to rank with other
principles of constitutional magnitude ...,114"Unnecessary rigor" does not
focus on the "conditions of punishment," nor does it limit itself to shackles,
balls and chains-the provision "protects
persons charged with crime from ill
115
or unjust treatment at all times."

10

"Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." Utah

Const. art I, § 9.
. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 128 n. 11 (Ore. 1981) (citing Tenn. Const. 1796, art
XI, § 13 in volume 9 at 148 (1979)). See Richard S. Frase, Cruel and Unusual Punishment:
Litigating Under the Eighth Amendment: Limiting Excessive PrisonSentences Under Federal
and State Constitutions, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 39, 65 (2008).
112 Utah Const. art I, § 9. The other four states use slightly different language: "No person
arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." Ind. Const. art. I, § 15;
Or. Const. art. I, § 13; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 13; Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 16. See Scott C.
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Constitution, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 751, 752-53 (1996).
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Symposium, The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. 1, 56 (2002).

Unnecessary rigor provisions "reflect a widespread interest in penal reform in the states during
the post-Revolutionary decades." Sterling, 625 P.2d at 128. Tennessee has interpreted the
clause to require prisoners to be guaranteed safety and humane treatment. Raedle v. Townsend,
1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3172, 1987 WL 7721 at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (Franks, J.,
concurring).
114Sterlingv. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 128 (Ore.
1981).
15 Id. at 129 (citing Bonahoon v. State,
178 N.E. 570, 571 (Ind. 1931)).
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In Utah, the unnecessary rigor provision came at a time in which

many Utahns exhibited vast frustrations with abusive criminal convictions
and sentencing proceedings." 6 Congress criminalized polygamy, resulting in
the incarceration of thousands of Mormon men, many of whom saw the
criminalization and resulting penalties as particularly onerous. 117 The federal
government's "zealous enforcement" of polygamy prosecutions "led to
allegations of disproportionate sentences for Mormon polygamists in
comparison to criminals convicted of other crimes...".8 Mormons' recent
recollection of polygamy-based incarcerations "undoubtedly ... contributed
to the early protections afforded convicts in Utah."". 9
The memory of past injustices, real and perceived, may have
influenced
the
Mormon
delegates
attending
the
constitutional convention to approve the inclusion of the

unnecessary rigor clause. 2 0
According to the Utah Supreme Court, the unnecessary rigor
provision "on its face" is "broader than" the Eighth Amendment and provides
greater protections to defendants.' 2 ' Prisoners are protected against
"unnecessary abuse" or "treatment that is clearly excessive or deficient and
unjustified ... ",122
"The unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution protects
persons arrested or imprisoned from the imposition of circumstances on them
during their confinement that demand more of the prisoner than society is
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entitled to require."' 23 The applicability of Utah's unnecessary rigor clause is
determined on a case-by-case basis. 2 4 The provision is "self-executing,"
meaning that it "prohibits specific evils
that may be defined and remedied
5
without implementing legislation." 12
Utah's unnecessary rigor provision could be read to prohibit the
execution of the mentally ill or even to prevent their arrest or incarceration.
To avoid mistreating those with mental disabilities, the provision could be
read to require sentences to be crafted with their specific needs in mind, and
to require the state to find alternative, non-punitive care for them. "'
Utah has a long tradition of treating the mentally ill with special care.
"It was likely that the need to care for mentally ill persons in Utah had
7
existed since pioneers first came west in 1847." 12
In 1852, the territorial
legislature granted county probate courts the authority to handle their
affairs. 128 "In early Utah, the ill and defective were the concern first of the
immediate family only, one's 'own folks."", 129 Importantly, "care of the
mentally ill gradually was recognized as a community problem."' 30 As
evidence "of active interest" in the mentally ill, in 1869, Salt Lake City,
"then a struggling community of only about 12,000 people, led out in the
establishment of the first mental hospital in the state.'' The Salt Lake City
hospital was "established as a place for the use and treatment of the sick, also
for the treatment and safekeeping of insane or idiotic persons.'1 2 This Salt
Lake City hospital was said to be a "'marvel for its cleanliness and for the
super medical attention each patient received."' 33 One grand jury noted that
the hospital, while clean and surrounded by orchards and gardens, also took
care of its residents: "patients were clean and well provided with clothing

...
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12 Id. at
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and bedding. The food was good and seemed to be sufficiently distributed, to
judge from the healthy appearance of all patients."' 3 4 In fact, "[p]atients who
progressed sufficiently [the director] took into his own home where, under
the care of his wife Elizabeth Riter Young, 'a good percentage' reportedly
recuperated fully or enjoyed long remissions."1
Not only did Salt Lake City provide a hospital, but territorial
legislation also criminalized any "unnecessarily harsh, cruel or unkind
treatment" against the mentally ill.'36 "As the people grew in social
consciousness, they began to realize that the ill and maladjusted not only
were a liability to the family, the community, and the county, but to society
as a whole. The next step was for this common social problem to be tackled
by the larger unit, the state."' 37 Territorial Governor George L. Woods asked
the legislature in 1872 to create a hospital for the mentally ill:
We ought to have an asylum for the insane. Humanity
requires it. There is no public institution where these poor
unfortunates can be kept. I should fail to do my duty were I
to omit to urge you to take such steps immediately as will
meet this great public want. "'
The next governor, George W. Emery made a similar plea:
We need a Territorial Asylum for the insane, which will
afford this class of unfortunate people proper treatment, at
the public expense unless they are possessed of sufficient
means to defray the necessary charges attending their care.
Such an institution is indispensible in every State and
Territory and should be under the control of a skillful
physician, who has had experience in treating this class of
patients. Humanity and wise government, alike, seem to
require of us such a provision, and I suggest some action be
taken by you looking to the establishment of such an
institution even if it be on a limited scale, though adequate to
the present wants of our people.'

Id. at 304.
TreatingMental Illness in Pioneer Utah, HIST. BLAZER 4-5 (1996).
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As early as 1880, the territorial legislature responded to their
governors' calls and authorized the construction of a hospital in Provo, what
is now the Utah State Hospital. 140 In doing so, the legislature believed "the
territory should provide a suitable place for the safe-keeping of insane
14 1
persons, and also provide for their care and comfort as far as possible."'
The Territory and counties were to split the costs of caring for patients if they
could not afford their care. 141 In fact, Superintendent Dr. Walter Pike told the
governor in 1888 that the hospital sought to use non-violent means if at all
possible:
We have endeavored to carry out the "non-restrain" principle
as far as possible, consistent with the safety of the patients,
but have found ourselves obliged to make use of some
restraint to prevent patients, while violent, from harming
their fellow patients. We endeavor to get along
with as little
43
1
display of restraint in any form, as possible.
The hospital's first report to the Legislature, in 1885, made serious
claims that it sought the betterment of the mentally ill:
The Legislative Assembly of 1880 provided for the erection
of the asylum, and made an appropriation intended to be as a
foundation for a home for the insane. Prior to that time, and
until the opening of the asylum, a number of our unfortunate
fellow beings, suffering from that most terrible human
maladies, mental derangement, were caredfor in places unfit
for human beings, and were destitute of comforts and
remedial treatment, and were only restrained from doing
actual violence to those about them. All citizens cognizant of
the condition of these unfortunates looked forward with
pleasure to the completion of this institution....
The building has been modeled on a scale of philanthropy
worthy of a great and good people, and commensurate with
the wealth and population of the Territory; embraces all the
improvements, conveniences and appointments of a modem
asylum, so far as completed, requisite to promote restoration
to those bereft of reason, whose recovery may be hoped for;

141
141
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141
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and to extend comfort and happiness, so far as possible, to

44
those whose mental alienation is irremedial and hopeless.

In 1889, George Sutherland, United States Supreme Court justice,
serving as a member of the board of directors of the hospital, commented that
while crowded, the institution was "in most excellent condition." The
hospital needed more room, he insisted, and "[t]o refuse it in the future is to
be guilty of grossly criminal neglect on the part of those having the power to
provide for it." 145
In fact, the hospital, rather than the jail or prison, was used primarily
to treat criminals who suffered from mental impairments. As one director
lamented, even for serious criminals, the hospital resembled a jail cell:
It is usually necessary in any institution caring for insane
criminals to have a small, very strong section for a few
desperate men. The unhappy feature in this institution is that
the little handful of men in this ward may never get out of
doors from one year's end to the next. We plan better for
captive tigers. 141
In 1886, the hospital's pharmacy contained pills, herbs, whiskey,
wine, rhubarb and ginger, which were all used in various treatments as was
hydrotherapy, which included the use of saline baths, hot, and cold packs. 147
Although the hospital used what modem eyes would see as more
controversial measures, such as convulsive or shock therapy, it was
"recognized that such devices were not conducive to either sleep or
conservation of energy, and their use was abandoned in favor of
hydrotherapy and sedatives, or other restraints supposedly more humane and
effective ...

Superintendent Walter Pike believed that steady employment "would
occupy [patients'] mind[s]" and was one "one of the most powerful aids to
treatment," consequently the mentally ill worked making items such as
mattresses and furniture, while• also
participating in occupations such as
149
sewing, farming and construction.
In the 1920s and 30s, efforts led by the Relief Society of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Rotary International, the Lion's Club
and the Utah State Board of Health resulted in the creation of a school called
'44
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the Utah State Training School for those with mental illnesses. Dr. George
L. Wallace, Director of the National Committee on Mental Hygiene visited
Utah and urged the creation of an institution. "It behooves Utah to take
intelligent self-interest in this problem of providing an institution for feebleminded. It is not altogether a question of state pride; the social and economic
15 1
cost to our State of neglecting to train this class is mounting rapidly.'
"When medications were developed in the 1950s that were
considered safer and more effective than earlier treatment modalities, nearly
all of the other forms of therapies were discontinued."' 152 In October 1951, the
Superintendent Dr. Owen P. Heninger, commenting on outdated treatment
techniques, told the Welfare Commission that "[t]here may have been some
excuse for the neglect of past years when society knew no better, but future
generations will not be so generous in their evaluation unless advantage is
taken of the knowledge now available."' 151 Starting in the 1960s, dozens of
154
community mental health centers opened.
Both the historical context underlying Article I, §9, as well as Utah's
unique traditions, show that Utah has long sought to treat and care for the
mentally ill in a humane manner. Utah has willingly taken on the burden to
care for and provide for the mentally ill in a kind and non-punitive manner.
The unnecessary rigor clause, thus, requires Utah to find and provide
non-punitive treatment for the mentally ill rather than incarceration.
CONCLUSION

As the above three examples illustrate, Utah's history and its
constitution provide a richly fertile ground in which to seek to protect
criminal defendants' rights. Criminal law attorneys should use their own
state's unique history to better craft state constitutional arguments before
their courts.
Lawyers should see the immense value in educating judges on their
state's history. Judges are well-intentioned, but that intent can be misused.
As Justice Louis Brandeis said, "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficent.... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment
155
by men [and women] of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.'
Through lawyers' efforts, courts can understand their own unique history and
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experience, so that they too, can protect a defendant's, as well as all of our,
liberties.

